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Observe coolly; react calmly;
solidify our foothold; never reveal our talents;
strengthen our defense; and never take the lead.
-- Deng Xiaoping
Abstract
This paper examines whether arms embargos are a necessary and effective tool to maintain 
the balance of power in East Asia.  This study argues that despite the fact that the international 
arms embargo, including that of the EU, on China remains intact, the balance of power in East 
Asia is already changing in favor of China.  First, the paper briefl y examines the EU attempts to 
lift its embargo, describes the current situation, and outlines future prospects.  Second, it reviews 
China?s military budget, military capabilities, research and development expenditures, and tech-
nology transfer from Europe.
1. Introduction
East Asian integration is an enormous and ambiguous project whose scope and limits can 
be diffi cult to determine.  Nonetheless, sound Sino-Japanese relations are a keystone to success-
ful implementation of an integration process in the region.  Leaving aside economic calculations 
and discourse on history and how they affect the prospects of integration in this region, this paper 
delves into the realm of security, specifi cally into the arms embargo on China imposed by the Eu-
ropean Union ?EU?, and discusses whether the lifting of the embargo would affect the balance of 
power in East Asia.
The EU argues that ending the arms embargo would not affect the regional security environ-
ment, but the United States and Japan insist that it would cause a shift in the balance of power in 
East Asia.  Beijing has been arguing that the arms embargo is a remnant of the past1 and that it is 
used as political leverage against China.  From the debate on this issue it is clear that while for 
Japan and the United States this is a matter of hard security, for the EU it is a matter of trade and 
concrete steps towards the establishment of a multilateral world.2 
The EU has not attempted to lift its embargo.  On the contrary, it calls on China to improve 
its human rights conditions in the country, especially after Beijing passed the anti-secession law 
in March 2005 ?clearly aimed at Taiwan? and during the escalation of the situation in Tibet and 
worsening Beijing-Lhasa relations before the Olympic Games in 2008.3
This paper examines whether arms embargos are a necessary and effective tool to keep the 
balance of power in East Asia.  It presents a twofold argument: ?1? even though the EU arms 
embargo on China remains intact, the balance of power in East Asia is already changing in favor 
of China; and ?2? East Asian cooperation or integration in political and security terms would be 
impossible unless and until China?s military spending becomes transparent and its military inten-
tions become clear.  To support this argument, this paper briefl y examines the EU attempts to lift 
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its embargo, describes the present situation, and outlines some future trends.  Secondly, it looks 
at the trends in China?s military budget, military capabilities, research and development expendi-
tures, and technology transfers from Europe.
To address the above issues this paper uses International Relations theory, specifi cally the 
Realist and the Constructivist approach.  In the author?s opinion, Realism is most applicable for 
this study inasmuch as there are not many liberals or constructivists among the decision-makers 
in the institutions relevant to this study, such as the European Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, Pentagon, etc.  In addition, the Constructivist approach makes it possible to 
interpret security in a wider scope, as an area not strictly limited to considerations of military 
power and performance.4  Moreover, through this approach it is possible to point out and analyze 
some problems in the security dialogue that are not discernible from a strictly Realist vantage 
point and to suggest some policy measures, keeping in mind that benefi ts of cooperation are not 
always material.
In this analysis the author uses a variety of primary documents, interview materials ?with 
Japanese and European offi cials?, and secondary sources revealing the policy practices of China 
and the relationship and activities between the EU, China, the United States, and Japan, as well 
as their individual and joint policy practices.  The issue of the EU arms embargo against China 
was discussed in the works of Nicola Casarini, Marcin Zaborowski, Jonathan Holslag, Ting Wai 
and others.5  However, to the author?s knowledge, there has not been a paper focused exclusively 
on this issue from the perspective of integration in East Asia and therefore this article can be re-
garded as a case study to explore the potential impact of the presence or absence of an embargo 
on East Asian integration.
In this study, the terms ?balance of power in East Asia? and ?security balance in East Asia? 
are used interchangeably.  The author deems this appropriate inasmuch as both terms refl ect the is-
sue of security in East Asia and how the regional powers ?states? change the balance in East Asia.
2. East Asian Regional Integration
One of the most remarkable developments in the second half of the 20th century was the eco-
nomic transformation that occurred in parts of Asia.  In Northeast Asia in particular, a process of 
industrialization and rapid economic expansion took hold that gradually spread to other parts of 
the region.6  However, it is important to emphasize that ?Asia? is a strikingly diverse place, and 
that some parts – the Central and Southern parts, for example – generally have not enjoyed the 
sort of economic growth rates that have attracted much attention from the scholarly and policy-
making communities.  As a result, scholars regard East Asia, which includes Japan, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
?ASEAN? as a region for integration for it was here that the conventional wisdom about the pos-
sibility of, and the preconditions for, economic development outside the ?core? industrialized 
economies of Western Europe and North America was fundamentally challenged.7
Yet, until recently Asian regional cooperation has been much narrower in character and 
based on largely instrumental considerations, focused on modalities and institutional mecha-
nisms, rather than the issues of identities and interests to be shared by parties to regional coopera-
tion.  Consequently, regional cooperation and plans for regional integration are far more fragile 
in East Asia than in Europe, where to a considerable extent the decision on integration rested on 
a common sense of identity and shared values.  While trade and investment opportunities are the 
basis for economic integration, all forms of integration needing stronger regional, supranational 
or intergovernmental institutions are only possible after the development of a strong, regional 
identity.  Such an identity, however, cannot be constructed by state action, but rather has to de-
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velop on the basis of shared values and interests.
Economic development everywhere is constrained or encouraged by specifi c historical fac-
tors.  Thus, whereas trade and fi nances seem to be the most successful domains of East Asian 
integration, political integration in the region has been considerably limited.  The emergence of 
China as a major economic and political force in the region may accelerate regional integration 
at a number of levels.  Yet even if it does, ?East Asia? is likely to be characterized by continuing 
variations in the level of economic development and political infl uence enjoyed by the very dif-
ferent countries of the region, such that the differences may make political and economic integra-
tion more diffi cult than it has been in other parts of the world.
East Asian governments are keenly sensitive to shifts in the military balance, and are active-
ly engaged in building international institutions in order to improve coordination on issues such 
as trade and the environment.  However, the ways in which Asian nations in the region perceive 
and respond to these threats and opportunities are strongly conditioned by the manner in which 
these issues are defi ned in the context of their domestic political cultures.  Moreover, there exist 
various domestic cleavages in the Asia Pacifi c region surrounding issues of national identity ?e.g., 
Taiwan and Korea? and historically driven animosities ?as between the PRC and Japan, and be-
tween Japan and South Korea? that sharply limit the prospects for cooperation and threaten to de-
stabilize regional security.  Above and beyond these obstacles, Thomas U. Berger notes, ?Chinese, 
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese elites come to institutionalize an approach in foreign policy 
which emphasizes economic over security issues, albeit in each case these approaches were based 
on very different underlying ideational-cultural understandings and emerged under very different 
circumstances.?8
The primary source of tensions that trouble the East Asian region today is rooted not in the 
geo-strategic environment, level of political and economic development, or the character of inter-
national institutions in which regional states are embedded.  Rather it is the product of deep-root-
ed historically based suspicions and animosities, frustrated nationalism and distinct conceptions 
of national identity, and differing understandings of the national mission in international affairs.9 
As this paper demonstrates, the EU attempts to lift the arms embargo on China as a litmus paper 
reveal how historical memory, security concerns, and lack of trust between Japan and China ham-
per East Asian regional integration.
3. The Arms Embargo Issue: History and the Present Situation
The EU imposed an embargo on arms exports to China in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square 
incident. Then in 2003, when the security issues were either absent or certainly not at the 
forefront of European considerations, it decided to re-consider this issue due to global changes 
that had taken place since 1989.10  In addition, in 2003 the EU and China agreed to form a stra-
tegic partnership.  Europe saw China as a new potential partner in forging a multilateral world 
order.11  The strategic partnership with China and lifting the arms embargo were attempts to coun-
terbalance US unilateral policy especially in the light of the outbreak of war in Iraq.  In Decem-
ber 2003, during the Italian Presidency of the European Council, the European Commission and 
institutions concerned were given a mandate to ?re-examine the question of the embargo on the 
sale of arms to China.?12  Ex-president of France Jacques Chirac and ex-chancellor of Germany 
Gerhard Schroeder were particularly enthusiastic about lifting the embargo, as it might facilitate 
arms sales to China, although they argued that they were not going to export high-tech weapons. 
In June 2004 during the Irish Presidency, the European Council invited ?the Council to continue 
its consideration of the arms embargo in the context of the EU?s overall relations with China.?13 
The European plans, however, led to a sharp criticism from Japan and the Unites States. 
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Australia also opposed the EU decision.14  Japan strongly opposed this attempt arguing that it 
would affect the ?delicate East Asia security balance.15  In the United States, both the Republi-
cans and the Democrats argued that the proposal to lift the arms embargo was a cynical ploy to 
open doors for the European defense industry and that, even if arms sales remained limited, the 
EU was casting aside more than a decade of human rights concerns for economic gains.16  The 
US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the EU?s moves toward lifting its 
arms embargo on China.  The resolution alleged that lifting the ban could destabilize the Taiwan 
Strait and put the US Seventh Fleet at risk.  Moreover, the US policy-makers adopted a series of 
initiatives clearly indicating the US opposition to the lifting of the embargo and some of them 
warned that if the EU ignored US security concerns the United States would place restrictions on 
technology transfers to EU member states.17  The US warning was a threat for European defense 
companies since they were still largely dependent on US defense technologies, not to mention the 
importance of the US market for them.  American retaliation could have taken the form of sanc-
tions targeting specifi c defense contractors that sold sensitive military-use technology of weapons 
systems to China.  Undoubtedly, the potential for US restrictions on technology transfers to Eu-
rope was a serious consequence for the European defense industry. 
It could be argued that the main mistake the European Union made was the absence of prior 
consultations with the United States on the embargo issue.  It was only after the public announce-
ment of the European Council on the embargo issue that Annalisa Giannela, Javier?s Solana Per-
sonal Representative on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, visited the United 
States, Japan, Australia, and other concerned countries to explain why the Europeans were con-
sidering lifting the EU arms ban on China.18  This attempt to end the embargo weakened relations 
of the EU with the United States.  Moreover, it affected the image of the former as independent 
and unifi ed in the eyes of China.
To improve the situation the European Council in December 2004 stressed that a revised and 
stricter Code of Conduct would be put in place.  Adopted in 1998, the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports laid down eight criteria against which member states would assess applications to 
export military equipment.  Several of the criteria took into account concerns expressed by some 
partners of the EU, especially the United States.19  In October 2005, the EU member states adopt-
ed a User?s Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports designed to help member states 
?especially export licensing offi cials? apply the Code of Conduct.20  Yet, the Code of Conduct 
was not legally binding and the Council in its Sixth Annual Report of the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports declared that a number of EU member states had partially sidestepped the embargo 
by supplying China with components for military equipment, particularly engines for aircraft, 
frigates, and submarines.  Moreover, the Council?s Sixth Annual Report showed that the value of 
licenses for arms exports to China increased from 54 million euros in 2001 to 210 million euros 
in 2002 and 416 million euros in 2003.  France, Germany, Italy, and the UK accounted for almost 
all of the sales.21  Thus, notwithstanding the embargo, some EU governments were able to sell 
components for arms and the European Parliament urged to make the Code of Conduct legally 
binding on all EU member states.22
Though officially not legally binding, the embargo remained intact and after the 2005 
elections in Germany ?Angela Merkel became Chancellor?.  Attempts to lift European arms 
embargo on China have actually disappeared from the European agenda.  In the meantime, 
it also became clear that the European and American security perspectives on China are not 
identical.  Indeed they are increasingly divergent.  Recently the continuing development of the 
EU as a global security actor as well as European security interests and the expansion of China?s 
interests overlap in some areas and regions ?Africa, Middle East?.23  As it will be demonstrated 
below, such overlapping of interests has not brought awareness to the European side that China 
has become a global power and represents both opportunities and risks inasmuch as European 
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companies continue exporting technologies to China as they are attracted to Chinese markets.
Being directly involved in the maintenance of balance of power in East Asia, especially with 
regards to cross-straits relations, the United States and Japan have acted in a much stricter man-
ner towards mainland China to avoid an arms race between Beijing and Taipei.
For the Europeans, the United States remains staunchly opposed to any policy change on 
the embargo and the EU is concerned about making a move that could undermine the post-Iraq 
transatlantic rapprochement.  However, the importance of transatlantic considerations in this 
decision seems exaggerated if not misjudged, notes Marcin Zaborowski.  Zaborowski continues, 
?After all, America?s other close allies Israel and Australia are selling arms to China, which so far 
has not led to any major friction in Washington?s relations with these states.24 ? Yet, according to 
SIPRI, neither Israel nor Australia sells weapons to China today.  Israel made its last transaction 
in 2001.25
With Japan and the United States on one side and Europe on the other, both actors looked 
differently at the issue of arms embargo against China.  While for Europe lifting the arms export 
ban is connected with human rights and the multilateral world system, for Japan and the United 
States it is a matter of hard security.26  When the word ?China? is mentioned in Europe, the fi rst 
reaction that a European would have is ?violation of human rights,? not ?threat to own security.? 
Herein lies the main divergence in the two sides? views on China, its military budget, and capa-
bilities.
In the meantime China presents three risks.27  The fi rst risk is a threat to China?s immediate 
neighbors, i.e., hard security.  The second is the export of Chinese arms models abroad.  There 
are already some precedents such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.  On the one hand, China does not 
interfere into the domestic politics of other countries.  On the other hand, it exports its military 
model ignoring the issue of human rights and democracy.  The third risk China presents is en-
vironmental and economic.  The Europeans are concerned with the second and the third risks 
inasmuch as they relate to their interests in Africa and around the globe.  At the same time, as 
Japanese diplomats note, Europe does not take seriously the security environment in East Asia.28 
Unfortunately this author has not been able to access any sources that could shed light on the 
progress of the East Asia Strategic Dialogue between the EU and Japan launched in 2005.  For 
the Europeans it is a forum to exchange opinions and understand each other?s positions on secu-
rity balance in East Asia not necessarily leading to operational conclusions,29 while the Japanese 
do not consider this dialogue very effective since everybody holds on to its own position and is 
not ready to change it.30  
Moreover, Japan does not believe that there will be transparency in China?s military budget.31 
At least it does not expect that it will be achieved in the near future.  As such, Japan has made 
steps towards closer cooperation with China, but China remains a non-transparent country in 
terms of military spending.  In addition, Japan views China as a rising and non-transparent coun-
try with a big population, big territory, one-party control, and a strong army.32  Japan?s main con-
cern vis-à-vis China is to know the true intention of the modernization process of China?s army.33
Europe assumes that economic cooperation will foster convergence on other issues as well. 
By increasing China?s dependence on European capital, consumers, and technologies, Europe 
wants to achieve a spillover of infl uence into other domains.  This liberalist approach implies that 
interdependence will make China automatically a responsible stakeholder in world peace and 
stability.  Moreover, developing China as a trading nation is also expected to promote an internal 
evolution that will help weaken the germs of nationalism and xenophobia.  Aside from this rather 
spontaneous fine-tuning, commercial ties permit active steering as well.  As China?s develop-
ment relies increasingly on Europe, economic sanctions and cooperation become more powerful 
tools for infl uencing China?s transition.  Thus, economic, political, and societal ties are sought 
to smooth differences in other domains, but the growing relationships are also expected to add 
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to Europe?s active-steering capacity.34  However, such active entrepreneurial approach of Europe 
has created a situation where Europe is starting to fear the resurgence of China where it infused 
substantial investments, aid, political efforts, and patience, but whose military spending remains 
non-transparent and military ambitions unclear.35
Offi cially the EU embargo remains intact, but there are some cases of weapons sales from 
EU member states ?namely France, Italy, and the UK? to China.  We may say that the United 
States and Japan uphold a realist approach and oppose the lifting of the embargo while the EU 
advocates a liberal view on relations with China in the military sphere.  Now let us examine Chi-
na?s military budget and capabilities.
4. China?s Current Trends 
China?s Military Budget
In 2008 China?s defense budget increased by 17.6 percent to $59 billion ?Figure 1?, which 
is 1.7 percent of China?s GDP, and $45 per capita.  Jiang Enzhu, a spokesman for the National 
People?s Congress, said that the 2008 budget would fund only a ?moderate increase? in weapons 
purchases.  He noted that most of the additional funds would go toward higher military salaries, 
rising oil costs, and training programs.  He added that the country has a long-standing plan to 
modernize its forces.36  From 2003 to 2007, China?s national defense spending increased by an 
annual average of 15.8 percent, while the government revenue increased by an annual average of 
22.1 percent.37  Hence, China argues that its military budget is mainly spent on army moderniza-
tion and on salaries.  However, Beijing does not specify the number and type of People?s Lib-
eration Army ?PLA? armaments, which causes speculation in other countries, especially in the 
United States.
Figure 1. Defense Expenditures of China, 1996-2007
Source:  Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People?s Repub-
lic of China 2008, p. 29.  The graph depicts China?s offi cial defense budget since 1996, and associated 
Department of Defense estimates of actual defense expenditures.  Announced budgets are from State 
Council announcements during the annual National People?s Congress meeting.  Department of De-
fense estimates include projected expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military research 
and development, and paramilitary forces.  All fi gures are in 2007 US dollars.
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The United States estimates China?s military expenditures for 2008 at $97-$139 billion, 
where the higher estimate is around 4 percent of China?s GDP.  Regardless of the exact fi gure, 
offi cials from the Pentagon intelligence service believe that the Chinese defense budget remains 
the second largest in the world.  The Japanese Ministry of Defense shares concerns over the lack 
of transparency regarding China?s military budget.  The Pentagon reported that China?s near-term 
focus remains on preparations for potential problems in the Taiwan Strait.  Moreover, China?s 
nuclear force modernization, its growing arsenal of advanced missiles, and its development 
of space and cyberspace technologies are changing the military balance in Asia and beyond.38 
Accordingly, though the arms embargo against China remains intact, the security balance in East 
Asia is already changing in favor of China. 
The US Department of Defense argues that the resources for PLA modernization include do-
mestic defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial development, dual-use technologies, 
and foreign technology acquisition – all of which are driven by the performance of the economy.39 
As China?s defense industries develop, the PLA is relying on acquisition of foreign weapons and 
technology, primarily from Russia, to fi ll near-term capability gaps.  China also harvests spin-offs 
from foreign direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian sector, technical knowledge and 
expertise of students returning from abroad, as well as state-sponsored industrial espionage to 
increase the level of technologies available to support military research, development, and acqui-
sition.  Beijing?s long-term goal is to create a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector able to 
meet the needs of PLA modernization as well as to compete as a top-tier producer in the global 
arms trade.  China is already competitive in some areas, such as communications with leading in-
ternational defense fi rms.40  I will argue in the following section that the primary goal of China is 
to develop a domestic space industry that would allow China to achieve hegemony both in civil-
ian and military domains.  That being said, the United States regards China?s modernized PLA as 
already a competitor to the US army in communications technologies.
At the same time, a slightly different take comes from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute ?SIPRI?, which placed China behind the United States and Britain in total 
defense spending in 2007, but 2nd to the United States in purchasing power parity at $140 billion 
to Washington?s $547 billion.41  According to SIPRI estimates, China?s military expenditures in 
2007 reached $58.3 billion, which is 5 percent of world total military expenditures.
The modernization and growth of China?s People?s Liberation Army ?PLA? does not raise 
the same concern in the EU as it does in the United States.  The EU recognizes that China?s rise 
must inevitably be refl ected in the military and defense spheres.  However, while the growth of 
China?s military spending does not alarm the Europeans, Brussels is increasingly concerned about 
the lack of transparency in this process.  In particular, the EU is skeptical about the actual level of 
the PLA?s budget and its military objectives.  Consequently, the EU has taken steps to develop its 
capacity to assess the PLA and China?s defense policy.42  While the US debate remains focused on 
the rapid growth of China?s defense spending, the Europeans point out that even if China spends 
twice as much as it declares, this is still a small fraction of the Pentagon?s nearly $500 billion 
budget. 43
Unfortunately, the author has not been able to obtain current information on European 
assessments of China?s military defense budget, but it is clear that the EU does not view China?s 
defense spending with as much sensitivity as the United States.  Europeans take the increase 
of China?s military budget as a necessity to modernize the PLA.  Contrary to the United States, 
the Europeans are worried not so much about the increase of expenditures as about the lack of 
transparency in the military budget.  While China explains its increased military budget in terms 
of rising oil costs and training programs as well as increased military salaries, the United States 
regards China?s domestic defense expenditures, along with indigenous defense industrial devel-
opment, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition as the main sources for the 
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PLA?s modernization. This modernization process includes the enabling of China?s modernized 
nuclear force, advanced missiles, and space and cyberspace technologies which have the real 
potential to contribute to a change in the balance of power in East Asia.
China?s Military Capabilities
China?s military budget is directly linked with China?s military capabilities.  Due to the lack 
of transparency in the military budget it is hard to estimate China?s military capabilities.  As men-
tioned above, Beijing declares that China?s defense expenditures mainly comprise expenses for 
personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment.  Personnel expenses mainly cover salaries, 
insurance, food, clothing, and welfare benefi ts for offi cers, non-commissioned offi cers and en-
listed men, as well as for civilian employees.44  Training and maintenance expenses cover troop 
training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and 
other expenses on routine consumables.  The equipment expenses mainly cover research on, ex-
perimentation with, and procurement, maintenance, transportation, and storage of weaponry and 
equipment.  The defense expenditures not only cover the active forces but also the militia and re-
serve forces.  Also covered by the defense budget are costs to support part of the retired offi cers, 
education of servicemen?s children and the national economic development, as well as other so-
cial welfare expenses.45  However, China does not provide specifi c details on the number and type 
of PLA armaments and maintenance schedules, nor the alignment of units, troop movements, 
training records or defense spending.46
Beijing realizes that the Chinese army must import advanced weapons and military tech-
nology from other countries through ?military diplomacy,? which envisages military exchange, 
cooperation with the neighboring countries and regions, and China?s involvement in global secu-
rity to build a stable and favorable international security environment.  China feels strongly that 
it must actively proceed with a ?revolution in military affairs ?RMA? with Chinese character-
istics.?  To achieve the RMA, it is faced with the task of the ?informationization? of the PLA. 
However, the ?mechanization? of the PLA to strengthen the mobility and protection of PLA units 
is still less than complete.  After witnessing the fi rst Gulf War and the Kosovo War, in which  pre-
cision guided weapons were extensively employed, China realized that major confl icts in the 21st 
century would be ?information warfare,? and that their outcome would be determined by C4ISR 
?command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance? 
capabilities as well as by advanced space technologies.47  With this in mind, the PLA set the 
?dual-historical task? of simultaneous mechanization and informationization. The Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars impressed the leadership of the PLA with the level of informationization involved. 
It was refl ected in the Chinese defense white paper, China?s National Defense in 2006, which de-
clared, ?the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning 
informationized wars by the mid-21st century.?48
We can conclude that the PLA is pursuing its goal by means of science and technology.  It 
works to accelerate change in the generating mode of war fi ghting capabilities by drawing on sci-
entifi c and technological advances.  The PLA seeks to raise its capabilities of independent inno-
vation in weaponry and equipment, as well as defense-related science and technology, and strives 
to make major breakthroughs in some basic, pioneering, and technological fi elds of strategic im-
portance.  It is stepping up its efforts to build a joint operational command system, training sys-
tem, and support system for fi ghting informationized wars and enhance the building of systems 
integration of services and arms.49
Taking the above into consideration, we can see that lifting the EU arms embargo on China 
would potentially allow China access to military and dual-use technologies that would help it 
improve its current weapons systems.  Moreover, due to the fact that certain arms and technolo-
gies have been transferred by European countries despite the embargo, China could have started 
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working on its future advanced weapons systems.  Ending the embargo could also remove im-
plicit limits on Chinese military interaction with European militaries, giving China?s armed forces 
broad access to critical military ?software? such as management practices, operational doctrine 
and training, and logistics expertise.  Moreover, if the embargo were lifted, China?s strategy 
would likely centre on establishing joint ventures with EU companies to acquire expertise and 
technology.50  Nevertheless, in the medium to long term, China is likely to be interested in acquir-
ing advanced space technology, radar systems, early-warning aircraft, submarine technology, and 
advanced electronic components for precision-guided weapons systems.
Since the 1990s China has been modernizing its conventional weapons arsenal.  In 2006-
2007 China decreased the import of military weapons by 62 percent.51  China imported helicop-
ters, radars, airplane engines and missiles, as well as Kilo-type submarines ?Figure 2?.
Figure 2. Russian Arms Sales to China, 2001-2005
Equipment Year Quantity
Su-30MKK aircraft 2001 38
Kilo-class submarines 2002 Up to 8
SOVREMENNYY II-class destroyers 2002 2
S-300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system 2002 4 battalions
Su-30MK2 aircraft 2003 24
S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile system 2004 8 battalions
AL-31F aircraft engines for the F-10 fi ghter 2004 100
IL-76 transport aircraft 2004 10
RD-93aircraft engines for the JF-17 fi ghters 2005 100
IL-76 transport aircraft 2005 40
IL-78 tanker aircraft 2005 8
Source:  Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People?s Republic of China 2006, p. 21. Note: Quantity indicates numbers of units in the 
purchase agreement. Actual deliveries may be spread across several years.
Simultaneously, China assembled airplanes under Russian license.  All in all, China will 
need Russian military equipment less and less. Meanwhile, according to SIPRI researcher Paul 
Holtom, ??T?he defense industry of China is developing due to import of license and equipment 
from Russia, which allows China to increase its own production.?52  At the same time Moscow 
fears that its military products would be copied by China.  For instance, Russia exported Su-27k 
and China now has a very similar airplane, J11B.  In its air force, China possesses more than 150 
SU-27s, SU-30s, and possibly SU-33s.  In the naval force, China bought Kilo-class submarines 
and Sovremenny II-class destroyers.  Thus, fi rst because of copyrights, Russia is not in a hurry to 
export more weapons to China.  Second, China has almost re-modernized its army and therefore 
it does not need more units of weapons from Russia.  Therefore, it can be expected that Russia?s 
exports to China will decrease in the coming years.  In addition, to counterbalance China, Russia 
also sells its weapons to India, which makes China very unhappy.
The most noticeable development in the overall balance of air warfare capabilities in North-
east Asia is China?s increased deployment of Su-27 and Su-30 fourth-generation fighters.  In 
sheer numbers of fourth-generation fi ghters owned, China already rivals Japan and may take the 
lead in the near future.53  If that happens, the balance in air power will greatly shift in China?s fa-
vor, with Japan losing the qualitative superiority it has so far enjoyed.  As such, the regional stra-
tegic balance is changing, and this is a critical concern for both Japan and the United States.54
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In addition, Japan and the United States are the only countries that operate full-scale air-
borne warning and control system ?AWACS? capabilities in East Asia, and the qualitative strate-
gic superiority enjoyed by both nations largely derives from those capabilities.  However, some 
security experts hold that it is only a matter of time before China puts full-fl edged AWACS capa-
bilities into operation.55
Finally, from a global perspective lifting the EU arms embargo could accelerate weapons 
proliferation to countries that the EU wants to remain isolated.  Beijing?s track record in transfers 
of conventional arms and military technologies suggests EU or other third-party sales to China 
could lead to improvements in the systems that Chinese companies market abroad, including to 
countries of concern ?in the Middle East and Africa?.  Hence, for the United States and Japan the 
main concern about China is a discrepancy between what it declares and what is really pursues. 
The problem of transparency complicates the situation around the PLA?s capabilities as well as 
around the lifting of arms embargo.
From a market viewpoint, lifting the EU embargo would also lead to greater foreign com-
petition to sell arms to the PLA, giving Beijing leverage over Russia.  To secure its share on the 
Chinese defense market, presumably the United States would start selling weapons to China 
too.  As a consequence, China could be very selective in the weapons it could buy to fi nish re-
modernizing its army, and according to strategic developments, it could export arms itself ?it may 
have potential customers in Africa and Central Asia?.
As demonstrated above, even despite the embargo remaining intact, the security balance in 
East Asia is already changing in China?s favor especially in communication technologies, and 
possibly even in air warfare technologies.  China?s primary goal is acquisition of advanced tech-
nologies, including space technologies.  Now we will examine what China does in the area of 
research and development.
China?s R&D Expenditures and Research Centers
During the Cultural Revolution scientists and scholars, and science and technology were 
oppressed.  At the 4th National Conference on Science and Technology in 1978, Deng Xiaoping 
made clear that along with industry, agriculture, and army, science and technology would be the 
fourth pillar of modernization.56  Since then, the expenditures on R&D have been gradually in-
creasing ?Figure 3?.  Although not considerable in terms of GDP ratio, we have seen an increase 
from 0.6 percent in 1995 to 0.8 percent 2006.
Figure 3.  China?s Government Expenditures for Science and Research, 
1978-2006 ?100 million yuan?
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexeh.htm.
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In 1978 the slogan ?Science and Technology is the leading productivity power? emerged.57 
After the announcement of three reforms ?state enterprises, fi nancial, and administrative? and 
in order to expand employment opportunities for China?s growing population, an emphasis was 
placed on the development of private business in the high-tech sector.  Later, in addition to tra-
ditional high-tech, China set up high-tech companies in information technology, biotechnology, 
and pharmaceuticals.
In 2006 the State Council of China adopted the Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-
Term Program for Science and Technology Development ?2006-2020?, which stated, ??B?y 
2020, the progress of science and technology will contribute at least 60 percent to the country?s 
development.  Meanwhile, the country?s reliance on foreign technology will decline to 30 per-
cent and below.?58  Thus, instead of dependence on imported technologies, China is going to rely 
increasingly upon its own resources.  According to the Guidelines, China will encourage enter-
prises to spend more on research and development while state fi nancial investment will be used 
mainly to develop basic research.
The 2006 Guidelines defi ned the priority sectors for technological development. These key 
industries were energy, waters resources, mining resources, the environment, agriculture, manu-
facturing, communications and transport, information industry and modern service industries, 
population and health, urbanization and urban development, public security, and national defense. 
With regard to national defense, it is envisaged that ?China will reform the current scientifi c and 
technological management system and combine and coordinate the military and civilian research 
organizations.?59  China encourages military organizations to shoulder the tasks of scientifi c re-
search for civilian use.  At the same time, civilian research institutes and enterprises are also al-
lowed to take part in national defense research projects.60
China possesses considerable economic and human resources to implement its strategy.  It 
welcomes the establishment of research centers and even provides a favorable tax regime for 
them.  It is also concerned with brain drain and prefers scientists and researchers not to leave 
the country.  As a result, China is creating appropriate conditions and incentives for domestic 
centered research.61  In fact, China has no shortage of well-trained scientists, engineers, mathema-
ticians or other technical experts.  A considerable number of Chinese scholars educated abroad 
over the last two decades are working on key research projects in China, applying both knowl-
edge and high technologies to conduct research independently or in cooperation with foreign 
colleagues.  Nowadays China?s research and development is especially active in nuclear power 
energy, space industry, high energy physics, biology, computer science, and electronic communi-
cations, where China has attained or is approaching advanced levels.  Such tremendous develop-
ment cannot but worry its foreign counterparts from the viewpoint of competition.
To conclude, China?s primary goal in the military area is to have advanced space tech-
nologies.  China and the EU have agreed to open their research programs to accommodate the 
increasing number of joint research projects.  More and more Chinese have been invited to par-
ticipate in the EU-funded 7th Framework Program for Research, Technology Development, and 
Demonstration Activities ?RTD? for the period 2007-2013 and China is attracting Europeans into 
projects under its research programs.
Sustained increases in expenditures for research and development, establishment of research 
centers, granting of a favorable tax regime to these centers, and joint R&D projects with foreign 
institutions and states provide a sound basis for China?s aspiration to become a major exporter 
of technologies in the future.  Moreover, since Beijing is uniting civil and defense research, it 
would not be hard for China to produce and export its own advanced weapons.  Obviously, the 
emergence of China as an arms exporter would restructure the world weapons market.  In order 
to achieve its goals as fast as possible, China is active in importing advanced technologies.  In the 
next section we are going to look at European technology transfer to China.
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European Technology Transfer to China
It is obvious that in an increasingly globalised economy China is likely to depend on its ca-
pacity to maintain and develop its comparative advantages in advanced technology goods.  The 
Chinese government has emphasized the need for FDI to be coupled with the transfer of more 
advanced foreign technologies to China.62  In an effort to develop high-tech industries, Chinese 
policies on import of foreign technologies have become increasingly selective and restrictive in 
the type of imports and investments that are allowed or offi cially encouraged.  In particular, there 
has been an increasing emphasis on industry-specifi c investment and high-technology imports. 
As a result, China has become the world?s fi rst exporter of information technology products, al-
though, as discussed earlier, the large proportion of these exports come from foreign companies 
established in China that import research-intensive, high value-added components.
Innovative technologies are tools to implement successful strategies to stay competitive on 
the world market. In 2006 the European Parliament acknowledged, ?China has tripled its expen-
diture on research and development in the past fi ve years? Europe must rise to this challenge in 
order to continue to benefi t from world trade in future?63 ?see Figure 4?.
Figure 4. R&D Expenditures in GDP in China, Japan, EU, and USA
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As demonstrated herein, research and development is relevant not only to trade and com-
petitiveness in the world but also to security, i.e., sophisticated weapons, social expenditures, and 
the competitiveness in many areas, not exclusively trade.
All in all, access to China?s attractive market is often used as a leverage to get foreign part-
ners in larger joint ventures to provide their technology on terms that most Western companies 
would not be ready to accept anywhere else.64  By purchasing high-tech goods off the shelf, 
China does not have to pass through the development process itself.  However, the government 
is also more actively promoting technological development and knowledge.65  Thus, in its EU 
Policy Paper, Beijing appeals to Europe to ease restrictions on high-tech exports, and vows to 
tap the enormous potential of technological cooperation.66  The Chinese side would like to see 
EU participation in IT promotion.  Space technology, high energy physics, polar exploration and 
development, the life sciences, biotechnology, bio-diversity, resources, environment, and human 
health are other major areas of interest to China.  China has succeeded in plugging into European 
expertise in several of these fields.  In terms of technology transfer, EU countries already are 
China?s biggest supplier of technologies and equipment.67  By the end of September 2004, China 
had introduced 18,363 technologies from the EU with a contract value of $79.4 billion.68  
Let us now turn to a brief review of how actively China and Europe cooperate in science 
and technology.  To start with, in September 2003 China joined the European satellite navigation 
project Galileo contributing 230 million euros.  As a natural consequence, this led to technology 
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sharing between Europe and China, which allows China to develop satellite guided navigation 
technology by Chinese domestic industry.  Moreover, China?s goal is to obtain military superior-
ity in space, which is a key element to achieving operational objectives of the PLA.  Although 
most of China?s space programs have mainly commercial and scientifi c purposes, improved space 
technology has the potential to signifi cantly improve Chinese military capabilities.69  The Euro-
pean side rejects American worries that China could gain a military advantage from Galileo.  The 
European Commission argues that the Public Regulated Service ?PRS? would be withheld from 
China and any other non-EU participants in the system.  The PRS is an encrypted signal, meant 
to guarantee continuous signal access in the event of threats or crisis.  Unlike other Galileo sig-
nals, the PRS will be accessible even when the other services are not available, making it suitable 
for security- and military-related uses.70  Yet, as Nicola Casarini acknowledges, ?there is still a 
fair amount of unpredictability as to what China will be able to use – or not to use – in the end. 
However, in any case research work on Galileo will assist China in fostering the development of 
its own, independent satellite navigation system.  In fact, as already happened in the past, China 
will almost certainly be able to use foreign technology to upgrade its indigenous space capabili-
ties.?71
Secondly, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom lobbied hard to convince Beijing to 
purchase Airbus aircraft instead of its American rival Boeing to secure the share of China?s rising 
defense budget.72  The partnership of Airbus, whose corporate parent is European Aeronautic De-
fense and Space, with China dates to 2005, when the company opened a design center in Beijing. 
In June 2006, Airbus agreed to set up an A320 assembly line in Tianjin.  That line, which is still 
under construction, is expected to make about four planes a month by 2011.  In November 2007 
Airbus received orders from Chinese airlines for 160 passenger planes worth about $14.8 billion. 
In return, Airbus promised ?to award to Chinese companies at least 5 percent of the supply con-
tracts for its next-generation widebody jet, the A350-XWB.?73  Outside of the Euro-zone, such a 
jet was only offered to Russia.74  Airbus said it would involve its Chinese partners in the develop-
ment of the 300-seat A350 plane in Harbin, where the site is expected to be ready in 2009.  Air-
bus said that its initial guarantee of 5 percent of the work ?may be enlarged based on the future 
business plan.?  In addition, Airbus signed a memorandum of understanding with the National 
Development Reform Commission that granted risk-sharing supply contracts to Chinese manu-
facturers for many of the A350?s moving parts, including wing fl aps and tail rudders.  Hence, Air-
bus has increasingly offered China projects that over time will make Chinese producers critical 
suppliers of components and sub-assemblies for some of the most important Airbus products.75
Thirdly, French nuclear company Areva won an $11.9 billion agreement to build nuclear 
reactors as well as to supply technology and uranium to China in an attempt to reduce its depen-
dence on coal.  Areva is expected to build two third-generation reactors at Taishan in the south-
ern Chinese province of Guangdong under a contract with China Guangdong Nuclear Power.  In 
response, the Chinese company agreed to buy 35 percent of the production of Areva?s uranium-
mining subsidiary, UraMin, which plans to obtain nuclear fuel from its three mines in Africa.  In 
addition, Europe and China could become long-term partners in nuclear fuel processing after 
Areva signed a separate deal with the China National Nuclear Corporation to study whether to 
build a reprocessing plant for spent fuel.
Finally, the telecommunications equipment maker Alcatel-Lucent, the engineering group 
Alstom and the utility groups Suez and Électricité de France also have large contracts in China. 
Alcatel-Lucent, the world?s biggest maker of telecommunications gear, received orders worth 750 
million euros to expand the networks of China?s two largest cell phone carriers.  The French util-
ity Suez signed agreements with two cities, Chongqing and Tianjin, for water and waste manage-
ment services, while the engineering group of Alstom received a contract worth 43 million euros 
to supply electronic equipment for the subway system of Shanghai.  Eurocopter, a division of 
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EADS, was expected to sign a contract with China?s military for 10 helicopters worth 80 million 
euros.
The above-mentioned cases confi rm the value of China as a market for European technology 
despite tensions over human rights, trade, and the environment.  To generalize, the accumula-
tion of the transferred technologies and their application in domestic research ?without invest-
ing heavily in research previously done by Europeans, Americans or Japanese? means that little 
by little China is becoming or has already become a leader in R&D.  As Nicola Casarini notes, 
?Europe has become over the years a source for advanced technology that would otherwise be 
more diffi cult ?if not impossible? to obtain from the US or Japan.?76  Access to advanced tech-
nology not only ensures competitiveness over a medium to longer term, but it is also a prerequi-
site for the modernization of Chinese industry and by default army.  Therefore, given the pattern 
of technology transfer between Europe and China, the practical impact of the embargo is highly 
questionable.  Moreover, though Europeans want to establish a system where China depends on 
Europe, there is the other side of the ?coin?: Europe becomes increasingly dependent on China.
5. Conclusion
The EU attempts to lift arms embargo on China have a direct influence on the future of 
East Asian integration and limited impact on the security balance in the region inasmuch as it 
is already changing in favor of China.  Firstly, in spite of the embargo some EU member states 
sell weapons to China.  Secondly, unlike the United States and Japan, Europe does not consider 
increases in China?s military expenditures as an alarming sign of its militarization.  Therefore, it 
is quite skeptical about China?s actual military expenditures and argues that still they are far from 
almost $500 billion Pentagon budget.  Thirdly, in the US ?and possibly European? estimations 
China?s modernized nuclear force, advanced missiles, communication, space, and cyberspace 
technologies are changing the security balance in East Asia.  Fourthly, China and the EU are 
actively involved in joint research projects, where Galileo is a most illustrative case.  Constant 
increases of expenditures on research and development, establishment of research centers, and 
granting of a favorable tax regime to these centers provide a sound basis for China?s aspiration to 
become a producer and exporter of both civilian and military technologies in the future.  Finally, 
though being aware that R&D is closely connected with dual-use technologies and advanced 
weapons, Europe actively transfers production together with technologies to China as in the case 
of Airbus.
Given the scope of cooperation between Europe and China, the practical impact of the em-
bargo on the balance of power in East Asia is doubtful.  It should also be stressed that while the 
United States and Japan uphold a unipolar world led by the former, the EU attempts to counter-
balance it by inter alia attracting China into the construction of a multilateral world order.  How-
ever, the emergence of China as a global player with unclear intentions presents risks due to the 
lack of transparency related to military expenditures, changing military balance in East Asia, and 
the hasty and selective technology import.
The arms embargo is not the most effective tool to contain China and motivate it to improve 
the domestic human rights situation due to the extensive relations that exist between Europe and 
China and the other ways in which European technologies are introduced in China?s defense area. 
The EU arms embargo on China is a litmus test on how the United States and Japan on one side 
and Europe on the other view China?s military capabilities.  Hence, until China?s military spend-
ing becomes transparent and military intentions become clear, East Asian integration in political 
and security terms would be hardly realistic.
Moreover, despite the obvious economic interdependence and shared interest in prosperity 
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between Japan and China, historical memory, security concerns and, lack of trust between them 
hamper regional integration that would require the development of a regional identity based on 
mutual trust and transparency, and shared interests and values.  Unless properly nurtured and 
further developed in a constructive and mutually positive way, contemporary Sino-Japanese 
relations would continue to be locked in the pattern of interdependence in economy and rivalry in 
politics and security, leaving no opportunity for ambitious integration plans in East Asia.
* This paper is an updated and revised version of my report ?EU Attempts to Lift Arms Embargo on China 
and Security Balance in East Asia: Implications for East Asian Integration Process,? delivered at the Sum-
mer Institute on Regional Integration 2008 at Waseda University, organized by the Global Institute for 
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Global COE Program, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration for its fi nancial and logistical sup-
port for my participation in the Summer Institute. I would like to express my gratitude to the supervisors 
and doctoral students who participated in the Summer Institute for their comments and observations.  My 
thanks also go to numerous anonymous offi cials who made this paper possible.  I am also indebted to Pro-
fessor Tsuneo Akaha for his comments and suggestions.
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